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Auditor Competition and Cost of Bank Loans
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of auditor competition on the cost of bank loans of client
firms. Exploiting the demise of Arthur Andersen that differently reduces the local audit market
competition of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), we find a decrease in clients’ cost of bank
loans in areas with a larger decrease in competition. The competition effect on cost of bank
loans is more pronounced when external monitoring is lower and when auditors compete more
fiercely with price. Our finding is explained by a model in which clients shop for audit opinions
and a more competitive audit market forces auditors to compromise audit quality to maintain
client relationship and market share.
1 Introduction
The US audit market is highly concentrated. As of 2017, the top four accounting firms, namely
the Big Four, collectively accounted for 93.6% of market share in terms of audit fees. Regulators
and market participants have expressed concern that the lack of competition resulting from such
high concentration might erode audit quality and negatively affect efficient capital allocation (e.g.,
Government Accountability Office, 2008; The Economist, 2017; Financial Times, 2016). Despite
these concerns, evidence on the effects of competition on audit quality is far from conclusive.
Furthermore, it remains unclear whether the resulting change in audit quality would materially
influence the financing cost of capital market.
This study fills the void and investigates the effects of audit market competition on cost of bank
loans. We focus on cost of bank loans for several reasons. First, the concern by regulators and
market participants is whether audit market competition eventually affects clients’ financing cost.
Zimmerman (2013) argues that changes in audit quality usually has a second order effect on firm
value. Examining cost of bank loans allows us to jointly test whether audit market competition
affects audit quality and whether the resulting changes in audit quality materially affects clients’
cost of capital. If the effect on cost of capital is inconsequential, the concern becomes less acute.
Second, cost of bank loans is less subject to measurement error. In contrast, other financial reporting
quality measures of audit quality, such as discretionary accruals and meeting or beating analyst
forecasts, can have high measurement error and even bias (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Third,
studies have established a robust link between audit quality and cost of bank loans (Minnis, 2011;
Minnis and Sutherland, 2017),1 which increases the power of our empirical tests and alleviates the
concerns by DeFond and Zhang (2014) that perception-based measures of audit quality such as cost
of equity capital have low power. In other words, if competition affects audit quality, the change
in audit quality should have a higher likelihood of affecting cost of bank loans. Finally, bank
financing is quantitatively important. Compared with public equity and bond offerings, private
bank financing is more common, which makes the effect of audit market competition on cost of
1Studies show that firms that provide audited financial statements and have higher audit quality also have lower
cost of debt, as quality-assured financial statements help banks to reduce information frictions (Pittman and Fortin,
2004; Minnis, 2011; Minnis and Sutherland, 2017). As bank lending becomes more transactional based over time
requiring verifiable hard information from financial statements, the role of financial statements and, by extension,
the quality of audit, have become increasingly more important (Armstrong et al., 2010).
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bank loans an economically important question.
Theoretically, in a classical monopolistic pricing model, monopolistic producers can charge a
higher price and reduce the quantity to increase monopolistic rent. Mapping this idea to the
auditing market means that monopolistic auditors and, by extension, auditors in a less competitive
market, can charge higher fees and reduce quality in order to capture economic rents. For example,
Mussa and Rosen (1978) demonstrate that monopolistic producers produce lower quality products
than do oligopolists. The prediction of monopolistic pricing models speaks to the concerns of
regulators and academics.
However, classical monopolistic competition models ignore a crucial feature of the audit market
and service industry in general. Auditors’ principle revenue comes from their client firms. This
implies auditors providing adverse opinions risk losing their client firms, a phenomenon known as
“opinion shopping” (Chen et al., 2015; Lennox, 2000). We incorporate opinion shopping into an
analytical model of auditors competing for clients. Based on prior studies (e.g., Newton et al., 2015),
our model assumes that opinion shopping is easier when competition intensifies. We demonstrate
that a highly competitive audit market incentivizes auditors to issue audit reports that favor their
clients to avoid losing market share.2 Therefore, in the presence of audit opinion shopping, more
competition reduces audit quality. Anticipating the potential erosion of audit quality, lenders ex-
ante charge higher interests.
We empirically test the effect of audit market competition on clients’ cost of bank loans in a
sample of US publicly traded firms that are matched to bank loan data from DealScan database.3
We focus on competition at the local market level, as prior studies document that auditors compete
locally as they have decentralized organizations and operate through a network of semi-autonomous
local engagement offices (e.g., Reynolds and Francis, 2000; Numan and Willekens, 2012; Chu et al.,
2018). We follow prior studies and measure local markets with metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs).4
2Similar effects have been shown in the credit rating literature. For example, Bolton et al. (2012) model the
competition of rating agencies in the presence of debt issuers shopping for higher ratings and show that credit rating
can be upwardly biased as competition intensifies.
3To the extent that firms that receive syndicated loans receive sufficient monitoring by lenders, which diminishes
the role of auditors, our results are likely to offer a lower bound on the effects of auditor competition.
4We do not preclude that auditors also compete in other dimensions. For example, auditors compete within
industries due to the heterogeneous industry specialization across auditors (e.g., Gerakos and Syverson, 2015; Chu
et al., 2018). We do not focus on within-industry competition because measures of within-industry market share
of auditors are likely to be correlated with unobserved industry characteristics (Minutti-Meza, 2013). Furthermore,
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Empirically testing the effects of competition on cost of bank loans is challenging, as unobserved
factors might influence both auditor competition in each local market and clients’ cost of bank
loans. We establish the causal effect by exploiting shocks to local audit market competition due
to the demise of Arthur Andersen (AA) in 2002. AA was one of top five accounting firms and
surrendered its auditing license in 2002 as the firm was convicted of obstruction of justice for
shredding documents related to the investigation of the Enron accounting scandal. AA’s collapse
eliminated a large auditor from clients’ choice set, which increased the supply of clients to local audit
markets. We argue that AA’s elimination reduced competition for clients among the remaining
auditors. A larger AA market share implies a greater supply of AA’s clients to the local audit
market, and therefore decreases the need of the remaining auditors to compete for market share.
In other words, a larger AA market share is associated with a larger reduction in competition
among the remaining auditors for clients.5 Our research design compares changes in clients’ cost of
bank loans in local markets where AA had a large share (a larger decrease in competition) relative
to that in local markets where AA had a small share (a smaller decrease in competition), using a
generalized difference-in-difference design. Because the collapse of AA directly affected AA’s former
clients who were forced to switch auditors, we drop all former clients of AA from the sample.6
Our finding is consistent with the model prediction that a decrease in competition enhances
audit quality, which reduces cost of bank loans. Specifically, we find that relative to those firms in
MSAs where AA previously had a low market share (a smaller decrease in competition), firms in
MSAs where AA previously had a high market share (a larger decrease in competition) experience a
lower cost of bank loan by 15.9% (about 22 basis points) after AA’s demise. The results are robust to
controlling for a set of firm and loan characteristics and MSA and industry fixed effects. Consistent
with audit quality being the mechanism, we find that performance matched discretionary accruals
decrease as competition decreases. We also find that income-decreasing restatements decrease as
because we lose many observations by requiring Dealscan data for bank loans, we cannot measure market share at
the MSA-industry level introduces because doing so introduces large measurement errors. Therefore, readers should
exert caution when generalizing our findings to other dimensions of competition.
5Our argument assumes that AA’s market share proxies for the magnitude of the supply shock of clients to the
local market. Consistent with this argument, Gerakos and Syverson (2015) find that audit fees increase in the post-
AA era for industries where AA had a higher market share. Landsman et al. (2009) find evidence indicating that
AA’s collapse represents a shock to client supply to the local market. We also empirically demonstrate a monotonic
relation between AA’s market share and increase in local market concentration, measured by Herfindhal index.
6Blouin et al. (2007) show no material improvement of audit quality of AA’ former clients after the forced auditor
switch, though Chaney and Philipich (2002) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) document a negative stock market
reaction of AA’s former clients surrounding dates on which AA was under severe scrutiny.
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competition decreases but only for low litigation risk industries.
Our identification strategy utilizes the fact that because AA’s local market shares in its pre-
collapse period are predetermined, uncontrolled factors driving the formation of AA’s market share
in each MSA are uncorrelated with changes in cost of bank loans of non-AA’s clients. Although
the assumption is not testable, we show that cost of bank loans of the treatment and control groups
exhibits parallel trends prior to AA’s collapse, which alleviates the concern that AA’s market shares
are correlated with unobserved time trends.
In addition to demonstrating parallel trends, we directly rule out three endogeneity concerns.
First, AA’s market share in a particular geographical area can be correlated with the industry
composition of the area. Our findings may pick up industry time trends. For example, AA had a
larger market share in the oil and gas industry that primarily clusters in the Houston area. A larger
AA market share can therefore capture local firms’ exposure to economic shocks of a particular
industry, in this case, oil and gas. We include industry-by-year fixed effects that allow us to capture
any time-varying across-industry heterogeneity and show that our results hold.
A second potential concern is that local economic conditions (that are not specific to an industry)
may simultaneously determine AA’s market share and cost of bank loans. However, we argue the
timing of AA’s collapse is relatively random as it was triggered by Enron’s fraud. If AAs local
market shares pick up trends in local economic conditions, we expect to find similar effects on cost
of bank loans by artificially assigning the year of AA’s collapse to another year. Following this
idea, we run placebo tests by replacing the event year (2002) with a randomly chosen year and
find the estimated coefficients become insignificant, which alleviate the concern that trends in the
local economy bias our estimates. In addition, our MSA fixed effects also absorb the effects of
time-invariant unobserved local economic conditions.
A third concern is that the event year of AA’s collapse overlaps the enactment of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act (SOX). Studies document an increase in audit fees and changes in auditors’ client
selection criteria as a result of more complex auditing procedures and increase in litigation risk
following SOX (e.g., Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Landsman et al., 2009; Iliev, 2010). However, we
are not aware of any empirical evidence that the enforcement of SOX and the associated changes
are systematically correlated with AA’s market share. Nevertheless, we take a more prudential
approach to rule out a SOX effect. Specifically, we match each firm in the treatment group with
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a firm from the control group using propensity scores generated from a set of pre-SOX client
characteristics and audit quality that could explain the effects of SOX. We repeat our difference-in-
difference specification in the matched sample and find similar results. Including industry-by-year
fixed effects also alleviates the concern of SOX driving our results, to the extent that the effects of
SOX mainly operate at the industry level (Reichelt and Wang, 2010).
In addition to the endogeneity concerns above, our results cannot be explained by two direct
effects of AA’s collapse. First, Landsman et al. (2009) show that the supply of AA’s clients increased
the capacity constraints of the remaining auditors. A larger AA market share should be associated
with more constrained capacity of the remaining auditors, which predicts a decline in audit quality
and an increase in cost of bank loans. The prediction is the opposite of our findings. Second, we
show that auditor switching and Big 4 auditors rebalancing client portfolios post-SOX do not drive
our results.
Having demonstrated that a decrease in auditor competition reduces cost of bank loans, we
explore the heterogeneous effects of auditor competition along two dimensions. The first dimension
explores the external monitoring. In our model, strong external monitoring increases the likelihood
that auditors’ opportunistic behavior is detected, which in turn deters auditors from lowering audit
quality. Therefore, an increase in auditor competition is less likely to increase the cost of bank loans
when external monitoring is high. Using analyst following and institutional ownership to proxy for
the strength of external monitoring, we find evidence consistent with our prediction.
The second dimension studies the abnormal audit fees paid by the client firms. We use the
abnormal audit fees as a measure of intensity of price competition in light of findings from prior
studies that auditors also compete with fees (Chaney et al., 2003). While we do not model price
competition, we argue that auditors facing fiercer price competition charge lower audit fees and have
less room to compete with price. To maintain their market shares, auditors are more likely to cater
to their clients’ preference, which, according to our model, erodes audit quality. Consistent with
our prediction, the results are mainly driven by the subsample of client firms paying abnormally
low audit fees (that is, fiercer price competition). In contrast, we find no statistically significant
correlation of auditor competition and cost of bank loans in the subsample of abnormally high audit
fees.
Our paper contributes to the debate on the effect of auditor market competition on audit
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quality. As noted by DeFond and Zhang (2014), prior studies document mixed evidence. For
example, using a cross-country setting and engagement level data, Francis et al. (2013) find that
concentration within the Big Four auditors is associated with lower audit quality. Similarly, Boone
et al. (2012) find evidence that competition lowers auditors’ tolerance for earnings management.
In contrast, using the US setting, Newton et al. (2013) find that higher concentration of local
auditing markets is associated with lower likelihood of restatement, consistent with the notion that
concentration increases with audit quality. Along these lines, Newton et al. (2015) document a
positive association between local auditing market competition and the likelihood of shopping for
opinion of internal control. The mixed evidence might reflect the theoretical ambiguity as well
as the empirical challenge of addressing endogeneity issues. In this study, we build a theoretical
model that accounts for the factor of audit opinion shopping. Empirically, we identify the causal
effect by using the shock of AA’s demise that differently affects the local market competition. Both
theoretical prediction and empirical findings point to the negative effect of auditor competition on
audit quality.
This study also contributes to our understanding of the role of auditors in bank financing. Prior
studies examine the usefulness of provision of audited financial statements (Minnis, 2011), and the
use of financial statements as monitoring devices by banks (Minnis and Sutherland, 2017). Studies
show that firms that provide audited financial statements and have higher audit quality have lower
cost of debt (Mansi et al., 2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Minnis, 2011). Given the importance
of auditors’ role in assuring financial statement quality, we study the effect of auditor competition
on cost of bank loans. To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine how financial market
investors, banks in particular, perceive the competition in auditor market and provides scientific
evidence to policymakers as to the nature of audit market concentration. Although increasing
competition might be beneficial in other settings, clients’ incentives to shop opinions might reverse
this effect.
Finally, our results also offer insights into the nature of auditor competition in the presence of
audit opinion shopping. Prior studies document that audit opinion shopping tends to compromise
audit quality. This study extends these studies by showing that a competitive auditor market could
exacerbate the opinion-shopping behavior of clients. Our finding is consistent with the notion that
the competition among monitors does not necessarily yield efficient outcomes if the companies being
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monitored pay their monitors (Bolton et al., 2012). Our study is also related to a broader literature
that reveals the dark side of competition in the financial market. For example, it has been shown
that competition tends to give rise to earning management (Shleifer, 2004), tax avoidance (Cai and
Liu, 2005), and credit rating inflation (Bolton et al., 2012; Becker and Milbourn, 2011).
2 Model
This section first presents a simple stylized model to illustrate the effect of competition among
auditors on audit quality in the presence of clients shopping for favorable audit opinions. The
model demonstrates that more competition can decrease audit quality and increase clients’ cost of
bank loans because auditors that provide adverse opinions risk losing market share. The section
also discusses related studies on the effects of auditor competition and on the role of audit quality
on cost of bank loans.
2.1 Model
Our model adapts Bolton et al. (2012)’s framework, which models credit rating agencies’ competi-
tion for clients’ business by issuing credit ratings, and shows that clients’ rating shopping, that is,
clients’ preferences for choosing rating agencies that provide higher ratings, leads to inflated rat-
ings. Our model below demonstrates that a similar result applies to competition among auditors
for clients.
2.1.1 Model setup
Let the true state of the world of a client i be ω ∈ {g, b}, where g refers to the good state and b
refers to the bad state and the realization of the state is observed only by the client. The good
state occurs with probability pi. The game described below is repeated for two periods. The states
of each period are assumed to be independent.
To generate a role for an auditor, we assume that the client always prefers to report g and is
therefore required (by regulators) to hire an auditor to certify its disclosures. The preference is
needed because if the client always reports truthfully, there will be no need for auditors to certify
the disclosures. In the baseline model, only one auditor, labeled with j, operates in the market.
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The baseline model is then compared with the case in which two duopolist auditors, labeled with
j and k, compete with each other for market share.
We first set up the auditor’s production technology. Auditor j has a production technology,
called ej , which represents the quality of a signal θj it receives regarding the true state of the world,
Pr{θj = g|ω = g} = Pr{θj = b|ω = b} = ej , (1)
where ej < 1 to prevent complete unraveling. The production technology ej takes two values h, l
with 1 > h > l > 0. A higher ej means a more precise signal. The same notations apply to auditor
k. To simplify the analysis, we assume that ej and ek are exogenous, that is, auditors are endowed
with a production technology.7
We next specify the payoff function to the incumbent auditor, that is, the auditor that performs
the audit service. The incumbent auditor receives a payoff at the end of each of the two periods
after the state ω of each period is realized. The payoff to the incumbent auditor in each period
depends on (1) the quality of the signal e, which generates a net pay-off, b(e), to the auditor, (2)
the loss of reputation given the detection of a lying report.
We impose several assumptions on the payoff function. First, the net benefit of a more precise
signal b(e) increases with quality, that is, b(h) > b(l). For simplicity, we will refer to b(e) as audit
fees. Because the signal precision, e is exogenous, audit fees are also exogenously given. We do so
to focus on the choice of audit quality when auditors compete for clients that shop for better audit
opinions, and abstract away from modeling the bargaining between client and auditors as well as
price competition among auditors. We defer the discussions about price competition and how it
could affect the model predictions to section 2.2.
Second, conditional on lying and that the auditor’s report differs from the realization of the
true state, the incumbent auditor incurs a reputation loss of ρ with probability α. The assumption
is but one of many ways to capture the cost of untruthful audit. More generally, a reputation loss
can occur in the form of incurring lawsuits from clients’ shareholders, or even losing one’s license,
7The assumption is not crucial for our analysis and reflects the reality that auditors typically have procedures
in place before they conduct audits. When we allow auditors to choose the technology, if retaining clients is very
important and the auditor anticipates that it will misreport conditional on observing b, it will choose a worse
technology l to reduce the signal precision. A lower signal precision reduces the expected cost of manipulation
because a report inconsistent with the true state can be attributed to a bad technology. In this sense, competition
also lowers audit quality.
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like the case of Arthur Andersen. The probability α can be viewed as the strength of shareholder
monitoring or external information environment that increases the probability of the revelation of
audit failure. For the detection technology, we make the simplifying assumption that the auditor
will be checked only if the report deviates from the true state of the world, which is revealed at the
end of each period. Because the auditor’s signal is not perfect, a difference between the auditor’s
report and the true state of the world can be an honest mistake. We assume that in this case, the
auditor will not be punished, so the auditor does not need to be concerned with Type I errors (false
positive) when it comes to detection. With probability α, lying can be detected and the auditor
loses the auditor fee b(e) and is further punished by ρ.
In each period, the auditor chooses a report r ∈ {g, b} to maximize its expected payoff after
observing the signal. Specifically, the incumbent auditor in the second period chooses a report
r ∈ {g, b} to maximize the second period expected payoff, conditional on observing the second-
period signal θ. The incumbent auditor in the first period maximizes the sum of the expected
payoffs from both periods, conditional on observing the first-period signal θ. Audit quality is said
to be lower when the auditor does not report truthfully. For example, the auditor reports g when
observing b.
To accommodate opinion shopping, we give the client the option to switch to another auditor
(when available) at the end of the first period if the incumbent auditor reports b.8 We assume
that when the client chooses to switch auditor, it commits to hire the chosen auditor in the second
period. As a result, the auditor that is not hired by the client receives zero payoff in the second
period. We use such a stylized setting to capture the notion that incumbent auditors may lose
market share when issuing adverse opinions. As demonstrated later, whether auditors that issue
adverse opinions lose their market shares depends on whether the benefit of lying outweighs its cost
and the optimal response by the competitor auditor.
Finally, we set up lenders. A typical model of a lending relationship needs to specify the
frictions that lead to the riskiness of the loans. Examples include asymmetric information or costly
monitoring. Detailing these mechanisms is beyond the scope of the paper and will not change the
main intuition of the results. The main prediction is unaffected as long as higher audit quality
reduces cost of bank loans. We therefore choose to model lenders in a very stylized way described
8The client has no incentive to switch when the incumbent auditor issues g.
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below.
We assume that lenders offer the borrower credits at the beginning of each period, which
abstracts away from lenders’ credit-rationing decisions. The loan contract specifies the interest
payment r and the amount of loan i with g > i > b. The loan amount is specified so that the
loan is risky. Audit quality affects cost of bank loans because lenders incur a cost c in the state
of the world in which the auditor does not report truthfully. The cost c can be interpreted as
the monitoring cost incurred by the lender when the audit report cannot be trusted.9 Lenders are
assumed to have rational expectations and understand the game played between the client and its
auditor.
The timeline of the game is depicted in Figure 1. In what follows, we focus on pure strategy
Nash equilibrium for client i’s incumbent auditor j’s report after j observes the signal θj and
examine conditions under which j reports the truth.
[Insert Figure 1]
2.1.2 Monopolistic audit market
Our baseline model features a single auditor j. Because it is the only auditor, it does not need
to be concerned about losing market share. We first focus on the second period of the game. First,
consider the case in which the auditor observes g. The payoff to j conditional on ej is
U(r|ej , θj = g) =

b(ej) if r = g
−αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) if r = b.
(2)
By reporting b when the auditor observes g, auditor j incurs a reputation loss only when the true
state is revealed to be g and lying is detected. This event happens with probability αej , because
from the auditor’s perspective, the true state will be g with probability ej , and lying (to report b)
will be detected with probability α. With probability 1− αej , the true state is consistent with the
auditor’s report or lying won’t be detected. In this case, there is no reputation loss and the auditor
9Alternatively, we can set up the model so that lenders are averse to uncertainty and charge a higher risk premium
when the auditor is expected to be untruthful, because untruthful audit report increases the uncertainty regarding
the state of the world. What is important to us is that lenders care about audit quality in some ways. Minnis (2011)
provides empirical evidence supporting the assumption that audit quality matters for lenders.
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gets b(ej). If the auditor reports g truthfully, it will get a payoff b(ej) and incur no reputation loss.
Second, consider the case in which the auditor observes b. The payoff to j conditional on ej is
U(r|ej , θj = b) =

b(ej) if r = b
−αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) if r = g.
(3)
The payoff in (3) is identical to that in (2). By reporting g, auditor j incurs a reputation loss with
probability αej .
Based on (2) and (3), the optimal decision is to report truthfully because lying only reduces
the auditor’s expected payoff due to the reputation loss.
Now we examine the first period reporting decision by the auditor. Because it is the only
auditor in the market, the client will have to choose it in the second period. So it does not need
to be concerned that its report will result in clients switching to other auditors. It follows that the
equilibrium in the second period does not affect the first period reporting decision and that the
first period equilibrium will be identical to that in the second period.
Because the auditor’s report is always truthful, the lender does not incur a monitoring cost ex
post. Ex ante, the interest rate r is chosen so that the lender earns zero profit in a competitive
lending market,
pi(i+ r) + (1− pi)b = i,
which implies that the interest rate is
r =
(1− pi)(i− b)
pi
. (4)
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, a monopolistic auditor chooses to report truthfully. The lender
charges interest for the amount (1−pi)(i−b)pi .
2.1.3 Duopolist audit market
Now consider the case in which auditor j faces competition from a second auditor k. We assume
that the client prefers r = g and will switch to k if k offers a report r = g while j reports r = b.
In doing so, the client promises to hire k in the next period, and auditor j will receive a payoff of
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zero in the next period. This assumption captures opinion shopping and is crucial to deliver the
results below. For simplicity, we do not further assume information asymmetry among auditors.
Specifically, we focus on the case where auditors observe the same signals and anticipate each
other’s reports. This case corresponds to our ideal experiment in the empirical setting, which is
the effect of competition among auditors, holding everything else constant. We assume that the
client will retain j, the incumbent auditor, if both k and j offer the same reports.
We first note that the second period reporting decision is identical to that in Proposition 1
because the auditor is not concerned about whether it can retain the client. In other words,
whoever is the chosen auditor by the client will report truthfully, which means that the auditor
will obtain b(e) in the second period.
In the first period, the two auditors compete with each other. The payoff to the incumbent
auditor j conditional on observing θj now depends on what j expects k to report. The reason is
that the auditor that offers the unfavorable report in the first period might lose the client in the
second period and receive a payoff of 0.
First, the payoffs conditional on observing θj = g are summarized in Table 1. The rows report
j’s report and the column reports k’s report. The entries represent the payoff to j conditional on
the reports of j (row) and k (column). Table 1 shows that the dominant strategy is to report g
when the signal is g. The reason is that reporting b will only result in losing the client and incurring
the reputation loss.
Table 1: Payoffs conditional on θj = g
Report g b
g b(ej) + b(ej) b(ej) + b(ej)
b −αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) −αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) + b(ej)
Next, we examine the strategy of the incumbent auditor j when both auditors observe θj = b.
The payoffs conditional on observing θj = b are summarized in Table 2. Again, the rows present
j’s reports and the columns present k’s reports. The entries represent the payoffs to j (the first
element in the bracket) and to k (the second element in the bracket) conditional on the reports of
j (row) and k (column).
Table 2 shows the potential dilemma for auditor j. If j chooses to report b truthfully and k
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responds by a report g, j will lose the client and the audit fee for the second period. Anticipating
this is the equilibrium, j might report g in order to keep the client.
Table 2: Payoffs conditional on θ = b
Report g b
g [−αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) + b(ej), 0] [−αejρ+ (1− αej)b(ej) + b(ej), 0]
b [b(ej),−αekρ+ (1− αek)b(ek) + b(ek)] [b(ej) + b(ej), 0]
Whether j has the incentive to misreport to keep the client depends on two conditions. First,
the payoff from retaining client i by reporting g relative to that from losing the client by reporting
b is non-negative, that is,10
∆ ≡ −αejρ− αejb(ej) + b(ej) ≥ 0. (5)
This condition implies that when k chooses to misreport, j’s optimal decision is also to misreport.
Second, the competitor auditor k has incentive to misreport when j truthfully reports b, that
is, the payoff to the competitor auditor k from reporting g is higher than the payoff from reporting
b, that is,
∆K ≡ −αekρ+ (1− αek)b(ek) + b(ek) ≥ 0. (6)
This condition is necessary because, as shown in Propostion 1, auditor j has no incentive to mis-
report absent of competition from auditor k for its client. It immediately follows from (5) that the
condition (6) holds when the condition (5) holds and ej = ek. As a result, condition (5) suffices for
characterizing the condition for a misreporting equilibrium. We summarize it in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. When ej = ek, a misreporting equilibrium exists, that is, a duopolist auditor
reports g when observing b, when the benefit of misreporting is large, that is, ∆ ≥ 0.
The plausibility of a misreporting equilibrium depends on ∆. A higher ∆ increases the attrac-
tiveness of lying. Condition (5) shows that ∆ decreases with external monitoring α and reputation
cost ρ. Higher external monitoring and reputation cost make lying more costly, which reduces the
attractiveness of misreporting.
10Note that the payoff function assumes that auditor j still obtains a fee even if it is fired. This assumption captures
the empirical regularities that both auditors are paid in the case of switching since the contract is signed prior to the
conduction of an audit. The main results of the model, however, do not depend on this assumption.
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Corollary 1. A duopolist auditor is less likely to misreport when reputation cost and external
monitoring are high.
Because of rational expectation, lenders correctly anticipate the likelihood of misreporting. If
condition (5) does not hold, competition has no effect on cost of bank loans because lenders do
not incur the monitoring cost c. Monitoring is instead delegated to the auditor. In this case,
the interest charged by the lenders is identical to that of the monopolistic case, (1−pi)(i−b)pi . If
condition (5) holds, competition impairs audit quality. In this case, neither the client nor the
auditor will report truthfully, so the reports becomes uninformative. The lender therefore need
to incur the monitoring cost c irrespective of the (reported) state of the world. The equilibrium
condition that determines the interest becomes
pi(i+ r − c) + (1− pi)b = i,
which implies an interest
(1− pi)(i− b) + pic
pi
. (7)
The interest rate in (7) is higher than that in the case of a monopolistic auditor, (1−pi)(i−b)pi . The
intuition is that misreporting is costly for the lender, who compensates for the cost of misreporting
with a higher interest rate.11
Proposition 3. More competition increases cost of bank loans.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
The model shows that competition for clients in the presence of opinion shopping can lower
audit quality. The crucial assumption of the model that delivers the prediction is clients’ incentive
to shop for favorable audit opinions. Empirical studies generally support this assumption (e.g.,
Lennox, 2000; Kinney et al., 2004; Lu, 2006).
The insights from the model contrast with those from classical monopolistic competition mod-
els, which do not assume conflicts of interests between the producers and consumers of a product.
11Also notice that the result does not qualitatively depend on whether the monitoring cost is incurred ex-ante or
ex-post. If the monitoring cost is incurred ex-ante, the lender can simply add c to the total investment i and make
it the principal of the loan. So the equilibrium interest becomes (1−pi)(i+c−b)
pi
.
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According to those models, if demand increases with product quality, more intense competition will
result in higher quality. For example, Mussa and Rosen (1978) compare a monopolist producer’s
price and quality schedule with that of an oligopolist and show that quality offered by the monop-
olist is lower than that offered by an oligopolist. Applying the theory to the audit market, more
competition among auditors will lead to higher audit quality, which in turn reduces cost of bank
loans.
Although both forces are likely to be present, because opinion shopping describes the data, we
state our hypothesis in the alternative form:
H1: Auditor competition increases clients’ cost of bank loans.
It is worth noting that most models of competition, including ours, focus on the extreme cases
of monopolistic producers and duopolist producers. When mapping our model into the empirical
setting, we need the additional assumption that more competition makes it easier for clients to
shop for opinions. Newton et al. (2015) provides evidence supporting this assumption.
An economic significant relation between competition among auditors and clients’ cost of bank
loans also relies on the premise that a change in audit quality induced by competition affects cost of
bank loans. Studies have documented a negative association between audit quality and cost of bank
loans (Mansi et al., 2004; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Chen et al., 2016) and between accounting
quality and cost of bank loans (Francis et al., 2005). However, the association applies to the whole
sample of firms. Changes in audit quality induced by competition might not be material enough to
affect clients. DeFond and Zhang (2014, p. 288) argue that ”the auditor’s influence over firm value
is comparatively small relative to the multitude of other firm-level and economy-wide factors.”
Given that lenders can privately monitor firms through debt covenant and private communication
(Sufi, 2007), it is conceivable that a change in audit quality does not affect cost of bank loans.
As a result, H1 is also a joint test of whether competition affects audit quality and whether the
corresponding change in audit quality affects cost of bank loans.
The next two hypotheses concern the cross-sectional predictions regarding the effects of com-
petition among auditors on clients’ cost of bank loans. Corollary 1 predicts that a strong external
monitoring can weaken the positive effect of competition among auditors on cost of bank loans be-
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cause stronger external monitoring increases the likelihood of detection of opportunistic behavior.
Prior studies document institutional investors and stock analysts serve as external monitors. For
example, Chen et al. (2017) suggest institutional investors can affect audit quality by forming a
more independent audit committee that tends to appoint a tougher auditor. Fang (2008) indicates
stock analysts frequently engage with managers and question various aspects of earning numbers.
Dyck et al. (2010) document stock analysts are directly involved in corporate fraud detection. Out-
side our model, stronger monitoring can also disincentivize a client firm from conducting opinion
shopping that could potentially hurt the benefits of shareholders. This force also weakens the posi-
tive relation between competition among auditors and cost of bank loans. We formally summarize
the hypothesis below.
H2: Auditor competition is more likely to increase clients cost of bank loans when external
monitoring is low.
A large literature examines how auditors compete with fees (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Chaney
et al., 2003). Although our model does not capture price competition, we argue that fiercer price
competition reinforces the incentives to cater to the client and lower audit quality predicted in our
model. Auditors that face fiercer price competition charge lower audit fees. When competition
further intensifies, they have less room to lower fees to capture clients. In this case, auditors are
likely to find other ways to compete and the force in our model is likely to manifest. Fiercer price
competition presumably also increases clients’ bargaining power in the auditor-client relationships,
as clients have more switching options available. If client firms possess stronger bargaining power
(Casterella et al., 2004), they can use auditor switching as a threat, thus increasing the likelihood
of opinion shopping. The discussion leads to the following hypothesis.
H3: Auditor competition is more likely to increase clients cost of bank loans when fee pressure
between auditor and client is high (auditors charge low audit fees).
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3 Sample selection
We start with the AuditAnalytics database that includes auditing information of all US publicly
traded firms from year 2000 and onward. The database covers information about auditor names
and auditors engagement office of each client firm. We first classify client firms into metropolitan
statistical areas based on the location of their corresponding auditors’ engagement offices. We use
the definitions of metropolitan statistical area published by US Census Bureau in year 2000. We
then calculate the market share of each auditor in terms of audit fees for each MSA every year.
MSA-years with fewer than four firms are excluded as the measures for market share can be noisy.
When calculating the market shares, we pool the market share of all non-Big 5 auditors and treat
the collection of non-Big 5 auditors as a single auditor.
We next merge client firms with financial information from Compustat database. Firm-year
observations with missing values of financial variables are dropped. Lastly, we merge the data with
bank loan information from DealScan database based on the link table used by Chava and Roberts
(2008). For the difference-in-difference regression setting that exploits the natural experiment of
AA collapse, we take a five-year sample period centered around event year 2002. The final sample
consists of 7,067 bank loan facilities that involve 4,402 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2004.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our identification strategy takes advantage of the demise of AA that differently affects the local
auditor competition across MSAs in our sample. Arthur Andersen used to be the fifth biggest audit
firms in the US as of 2001. AA went out of business in 2002 due to destroying relevant documents
related to Enron’s scandal (although only a small portion of AA’s employees were involved). The
demise of AA has two important features that allow us to identify the causal effects of audit market
competition on clients’ cost of bank loans. First, the collapse of AA was triggered by the Enron
scandal and was not anticipated. Therefore, it is unlikely that clients took actions in the years prior
to the collapse of AA, which alleviates endogeneity concerns. Second, the sudden disappearance of
a big player in the market introduced supply shocks to local audit markets. Because local audit
markets with a higher market share of AA in the pre-collapse period experienced a larger increase
in the supply of clients, we argue that the incentive to compete for clients declined more for these
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markets. We also verify later that markets where AA had a larger share experienced higher increase
in market concentration post AA’s collapse, which is associated with less competition.
We evenly sort all MSAs in our sample into two groups according to their corresponding market
share of AA in 2001, one year prior to AA collapse. We label as treatment the group of MSAs with
higher market share of AA and the rest as control. We argue that the treatment group experienced
a larger decrease in local market competition relative to that of the control group because of a
larger supply of AA’s clients. The difference in the intensity of treatment in turns allows us to
identify whether changes in local audit market concentration affect clients cost of bank loans. Our
analysis excludes AAs clients, as their cost of bank loans can be affected by reputation concerns
due to AAs audits. The difference-in-difference regression is specified as follows:
ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t) = ω0 + ω1Treat× Post+ ω2Treat+ ψ′X + ηi,s,t, (8)
where subscripts i, s, t denote the loan facility, borrowing firm, and year, respectively.
The outcome variable ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t) is the logarithm of loan spread, measured as the
excess of borrowing interest rate over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent benchmark rate. The indicator
variable Treat is one if firm s is based in a MSA that is classified into treatment group and zero
otherwise. The dummy variable Post takes value one if the year t is on or after 2002, and zero
otherwise.
The vector X includes a set of control variables following Valta (2012). We include a set of firm
characteristics that include firm size, ln(Assetss,t), return on assets, ROAs,t, the amount of tangible
assets, Tangibilitys,t, leverage ratio Leverages,t, market to book ratio MBs,t, cash flow volatility
CF V ols,t, and Altman Z score, Z-Scores,t. We also control for loan characteristics including the
loan facility amount, LoanSizei,s,t, the maturity of loan facility, ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy
variable indicating whether a loan is syndicated (DSyndication). A set of three-digit SIC industry
dummies and year dummies are in place to control for industry- and year-level heterogeneities. We
cluster standard errors at the MSA level.
Our primary interest lies in coefficient ω1 that captures the difference of treatment and control
groups in the change of cost of bank loans before and after AA collapse. Because we estimate
the change in cost of bank loans, the identification assumption is that the spatial variation of AAs
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market share is exogenous to the change in non-AAs clients economic characteristics. We address
potential violations of the identification assumption in later sections.
5 Results
This section presents our main result on the effect of competition among auditors on clients
cost of bank loans. We begin with descriptive analysis and a validity test to show AA’s collapse has
material impact on local audit market competition. We then present our baseline findings, followed
by addressing endogeneity concerns and documenting the mechanisms underlying the baseline find-
ings. We finally explore heterogeneous effects of auditor competition along two dimensions: external
monitoring and abnormal audit fees.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The average
log loan spread is 4.95 (141 basis points). Loans differ in their characteristics. Loan issuance size
varies over the cross section with 4.4% of total asset at the 25th percentile and 37.4% of total asset
at the 75th percentile. The majority (94.4%) of loans covered by Dealscan are syndicated loans.
The concentration on syndicated loans means that our sample consists of larger borrowers. To the
extent that larger borrowers have other means to communicate with lenders other than financial
statements, and are subject to more monitoring by analysts and institutional investors, auditor
market competition may impact them less. Firms in our sample are generally large firms with high
profitability with an average ROA of 11.7%. The average firm has about 31% intangible assets,
debt to market equity ratio of 0.89, and market to book ratio of 2.5. Firms in our sample are
generally not very risky with Altman Z-score of 1.76. The average restatement rate is 0.123.
[Insert Table 1.]
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of the number of firm years and the number of firms
across MSAs. An MSA on average has 39.4 firms and 75 firm-year observations. Not surprisingly,
firms are not evenly distributed across MSAs. The smallest MSA has 4 firms and 8 firm-year
observations. The largest MSA has 317 firms and 669 firm-year observations.
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Our research design builds on the premise that the AA’s collapse increased the supply of clients
to the remaining auditors, which decreased the local audit market competition, and that a larger
AA’s market share further reduces competition. To formally validate this assumption, we regress
the change of local auditor concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI)
of auditor local market share, on AA’s market share in the pre-collapse year (2001).
Table 2 presents the regression results. In Columns (1) and (2), we find the change of local
auditor concentration ∆HHIm,2001−2002 is positively associated with AA’s local market share, either
measured by the percentage of AA’s market share (AA Mkt Sharem,2001) or a binary variable (0/1)
indicating MSAs with above-median AA’s market share (DAA Mkt Sharem,2001 ). In other words, MSAs
where AA had a higher market share experience a larger increase in market concentration relative
to MSAs where AA had a smaller market share. The point estimate of DAA Mkt Sharem,2001 at 0.059
implies that the change of auditor concentration from 2001 to 2002 is 5.9% higher in MSAs with a
high market share of AA than that in MSAs with a low market share. Columns (3) and (4) report
quantitatively similar results when we measure local auditor concentration by the HHI of local
market share among the big 5 auditors. In fact, the big 5 auditors have occupied majority of audit
market for public firms, so the resulting high correlation of the two concentration measures leads
to highly similar coefficient estimates between Columns (1)-(2) and Columns (3)-(4). Overall,
our results suggest the sudden demise of AA indeed imposes a shock to the local audit market
competition.
[Insert Table 2.]
5.2 Baseline Results
This section examines whether shocks to local market competition induced by the collapse of
AA affect clients’ cost of bank loans. Table 3 presents the results using the specification outlined
in Eq.(8). Recall that our difference-in-difference design marks as treated (Treat = 1) loans issued
to clients located in MSAs where AA had a larger market share prior to its demise, and as control
(Treat = 0) loans issued by clients located in MSAs where AA had a smaller market share. Clients
located in MSAs with a higher AA’s market share experience a larger decrease in competition. If
audit market competition increases cost of bank loans, we will see a larger change in cost of bank
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loans for clients located in MSAs with a higher AA’s market share relative to those located in MSAs
with a lower AA’s market share.
[Insert Table 3.]
Table 3 reports the regression results progressively. Column (1) does not any control variables
and fixed effects. Column (2) adds MSA and three-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Column (3)
further adds controls for firm characteristics. Column (4) adds audit fees to control for the level of
price competition and changes in the audit cost due to Sarbanes Oxley act (Iliev, 2010). Column (5)
adds Z-score to control for observed credit risk. Column (6) adds controls for loan characteristics.
Across all specifications, we find the coefficient estimate of Treat×Post is statistically negative
and stays relatively stable across all columns. The economic significance is sizable. In Column (1),
the cost of bank loans for clients located in MSAs with high AA’s market share decrease by 16.0%
relative to that for clients located in MSAs with high AA’s market share, a decrease translating to
22 basis point decrease in the cost of bank loans for an average firm that has 141 basis point cost of
bank loans in our sample. The corresponding estimate in column (6), our most strict specification,
is 8.6%, which represents 12.1 basis points.
The firm-level control variables generally have the expected signs. For example, firm size
(ln(Assetss,t)), profitability (ROAs,t), tangibility (Tangibilitys,t), and growth potential ((MBs,t))
correlate negatively with cost of bank loans. Firm leverage (Leverages,t), on the other hand, posi-
tively correlates with cost of bank loans. The results suggest the creditors, on average, prefer large
and mature firms with good profitability, low leverage, and a high level of tangible assets. As for
the loan characteristics controls, a longer loan maturity and syndicated loans tend to have higher
interest rates, whereas a large loan amount tends to have lower interest rates.
Overall, the finding from Table 3 supports our model prediction that more competition increases
cost of bank loans, and is inconsistent with traditional oligopolistic competition models that predict
an increase in audit quality and a reduction in cost of bank loans as competition intensifies. At
this point, however, it remains possible that competition might reduce audit quality through other
channels. In what follows, we rule out several endogeneity concerns, and validate the channels
through which our main results manifest. We also use cross-sectional tests to further validate that
our main results are driven by competition among auditors.
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5.2.1 Endogeneity concerns
Our difference-in-difference analysis compares the change in the cost of bank loans charged to
non-AA clients before and after AA’s collapse as a function of AA’s market share. The identifying
assumption of the difference-in-difference analysis is that AA’s market share is unrelated to unob-
served factors that changed the cost of bank loans of non-AA clients around AA’s demise. In other
words, absent of the AA’s collapse, the costs of bank loans of the treatment and control groups
follow parallel trends. Although the assumption is not directly testable, Figure 3 plots the cost of
bank loans over time separately for the treatment and control groups. The graphs do not suggest
a correlation between time trends and AA’s market shares prior to AA’s collapse.
[Insert Figure 3.]
We next investigate three scenarios in which the identification assumption may fail. First, our
results might be driven by shocks to industries in which AA are specialists. Prior studies document
that auditors specialize in different industries (e.g., Gerakos and Syverson, 2015). AA’s market
share would be higher in MSAs where industries that AA specialized in were more represented. For
example, oil and gas industry is more represented in Houston and was more likely to be audited
by AA. If industries in which AA specialized experienced economic shocks, higher market share
would capture the extent to which local economy was exposed to the economic shocks, which in
turn affected cost of bank loans. To rule out this concern, we add industry-by-year fixed effects that
absorb time-varying economic shocks to each two-digit SIC industry. In this specification, spatial
variation in AA’s local market share within an industry-year is used as the source of identification.
The result shows that the addition of the industry-by-year dummies doesn’t effectively alter the
magnitude of coefficient on Treat×Post, suggesting that time varying industry shocks do not drive
our results.
Second, the local economical conditions at the level of MSA can be another source of endogeneity.
For instance, the economic development of a MSA can be correlated with AA’s market share and,
at the same time, determines the cost of bank loans of local firms. However, the timing of AA
collapse is unlikely to be anticipated by client firms, as it was triggered by the detection of Enron’s
fraud. Therefore, if the pre-collapse market share of AA coincidentally picks up any effects of local
economic conditions, we would expect these effects to continue in the years after the collapse of
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AA. Therefore, if we artificially assign the treatment year to a randomly chosen year, we should
observe similar effects on cost of bank loans.
Following this idea, we perform placebo tests to rule out any spurious correlation between AA’s
market share and the local economy that may affect cost of bank loans. Table 4 presents the
regression results. Columns (1)-(4) respectively set the pseudo event year to 2005, 2007, 2009, and
2011 and repeat the regression specification in Eq.8. Across all four specifications, the coefficient
estimate of Treat × Post is statistically and economically insignificant. The results suggest local
economic conditions have little impact on the baseline results.
[Insert Table 4.]
Furthermore, to the extent all auditors prefer more economically developed areas, we should
observe both lower market concentration and lower cost of bank loan in these areas, which points
to a positive relation between AA’s market share (high concentration) and cost of bank loans. This
argument works against finding a negative correlation of AA’s market share and change in cost of
bank loans. Our empirical findings would therefore be stronger if local economic conditions were
absent.
Third, the event year 2002 in our regression design overlaps with the legislation year of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX). A potential concern is that our empirical findings are driven by the consequences
of SOX, which aims to discipline the auditing profession. However, SOX uniformly applies to every
firm. By design, the time dummy Post in difference-in-difference specification should capture this
time trend caused by SOX if there is any. Our industry-by-year fixed effect structure further rules
out the concern that the differential effects of SOX across industries drive the relation between
AA’s regional market share and changes in non-AA clients’ cost of bank loans around 2002.
It remains possible that after controlling for industry-by-year fixed effects, the effects of SOX
differ across each firm within an industry-year, which drive the relation between AA’s regional
market share and changes in non-AA clients’ cost of bank loans around 2002. Before addressing
this concern, we argue that individual client firms’ exposure to SOX is unlikely to explain our
findings. Because we account for industry-by-year fixed effects, to explain our findings, trends in
the unobserved determinants of cost of bank loans of a non-AA client within a given industry-year
have to be correlated with AA’s market share in that region, and the correlation has to be systematic
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across the 57 MSAs in our sample. Although we cannot completely rule out this possibility, we are
not aware of an economic theory that predicts this result. Nevertheless, we employ a propensity
score matching approach to sharpen the empirical design. For each firm in the treatment group,
we find a closest matching firm in the control group from the same two-digit SIC industry code
based on the propensity scores of being in the treatment group. In particular, we estimate a probit
model where the dependent variable is set to one for firms in the treatment group of the baseline
sample. The probit model includes firm size, tangibility, and profitability, and two measures for
audit quality, as proxied by performance-based discretionary accruals computed using the model
of (Kothari et al., 2005) and accounting restatement. The model is estimated using observations
in the pre-SOX year. We produce the propensity scores from the model output. Presumably, the
effects of SOX should be similar among client firms with similar characteristics and audit quality
prior to SOX, considering SOX aims to improve the service quality in the audit profession. In total,
there are 2,048 treated firms that are matched to control firms.
Table 5 presents the empirical results. Panel A reports the matching quality. The pairwise
difference test indicates the treated firms and their matching control firms are statistically insignif-
icant along the matching variables. We repeat the regression specification in each column of Table
3 using the propensity-score matched sample and report the estimates in Panel B. The coefficient
estimate Treat × Post is statistically significant and economically sizable across all columns. In
Column (1), for instance, the estimate of Treat × Post implies the change of cost of bank loans
from before to after event for treated firms is 34.3% lower than their corresponding control firms.
In sum, the three robustness checks in this section, together with our baseline findings, all point to
a positive causal effect of audit market competition and cost of bank loans.
[Insert Table 5.]
Besides the endogeneity concerns, we rule out several alternative explanations for our results.
Prior studies document that SOX changed client-auditor matching (Landsman et al., 2009). If
Big 4 auditors located in MSAs with a bigger AA’s market share tend to select less risky clients
post-SOX, our results could be driven by client selection. In untabulated anaysis, we show that
our results continue to hold when restricting our sample to Big 4 clients only and to client firms
that do not switch auditors. We also control for litigation risk based on the court ideology measure
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proposed by Huang et al. (2018) to rule out the possibility that changes in litigation enforcement
vary with AA’s market share. Untabulated analysis shows that our results continue to hold.
The final issue we deal with is that in the baseline difference-in-difference specification, we use
an indicator variable Treat to classify two groups of MSAs that are differently affected by the
collapse of AA. We do so to reduce measurement error in the treatment variable. We examine
the robustness of the results to two alternative measures to proxy for the change of competition
surrounding the AAs event.
The first measure is a set of dummy variables. We stratify MSAs into five quantiles by their re-
spective market share of AA in 2001 and mark the i-th quantile by a dummy variable AA ShareQi ,
where integer i = 1, 2, ..., 5. The magnitude of AA’s shock should increase with the order of the
quantile, with the first quantile (as marked by AA ShareQ1) experiencing the weakest and the fifth
quantile (as marked by AA ShareQ5) strongest. Thus, the treatment effect of auditor concentra-
tion on cost of bank loans should increase with the order of quantile accordingly. We repeat the
regression specification in Column 5-6 of Table 3 and report the regression results in Columns 3-4
of Table 6. We choose MSAs assigned to the first quantile as the reference group, so AA ShareQ1
and the relevant interaction terms are absorbed and not reported. The coefficient estimates of
AA ShareQi×Post all appear to be negative and, in general, the coefficient of AA ShareQi×Post
decreases with i. The results are consistent with our baseline findings that auditor concentration
is negatively related to cost of bank loans.
[Insert Table 6.]
The second measure directly uses AAs market share in 2001 to represent the AA’s shock to local
auditor competition without grouping MSAs. The results reported in Columns 5-6 of Table 6
remain qualitatively similar to our baseline results. Both alternative measures employ a more
detailed partition of MSA-sample provides richer cross-sectional variation but risks measurement
errors in a relatively small sample. We therefore take a more prudential approach in our baseline
regression by partitioning the MSAs into two groups.
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5.2.2 The effect on audit quality
Our main hypothesis argues that fiercer auditor competition lowers the audit quality, which is
the mechanism through which cost of bank loans changes. In this section, we formally test the
mechanism. We use two measures of audit quality from prior studies, the amount of discretionary
accruals and whether a firm restated its financial statements (see DeFond and Zhang (2014) for a
review of proxies for audit quality measures). For this test, we are able to use a broader sample
instead of just borrowers covered by the Dealscan data.12 As a result, we have a higher number of
observations at the client-year level. We model audit quality as a function of AA’s market share
using the following specification,
Audit Qualitys,t = λ0 + λ1Treat× Post+ λ2Treat+ λ3Post+ Ψ′X + κj,t + ηs,t, (9)
where Audit Qualitys,t denotes one of two audit quality measures. Our hypothesis predicts λ1 < 0.
[Insert Table 7.]
Table 7 uses abnormal accruals as the measure of audit quality. We follow Kothari et al.
(2005) and use the performance-matched discretionary accrual. In particular, we first estimate the
following modified Jone model
TAs,t
Assets,t−1
= β1
1
Assets,t−1
+ β2
∆Sales,t
Assets,t−1
+ β3
PPEs,t
Assets,t−1
+ s,t, (10)
where TAs,t is total accruals measured by earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued
operations (IBC), Assets,t−1 is total assets (AT ) of year t−1, Sales,t is the change in sales (SALE)
from year t−1 to t, and PPEs,t is gross capital stock (PPEGT ). We next substitute the estimated
coefficient into the following equation to estimate the normal accrual NAs,t.
NAs,t = βˆ1
1
Assets,t−1
+ βˆ2
∆Sales,t −∆ARs,t
Assets,t−1
+ βˆ3
PPEs,t
Assets,t−1
, (11)
where ARs,t is the change in account receivable (RECT ). The discretionary accrual is the difference
between
TAs,t
Assets,t−1 and NAs,t. The result shows that clients in MSAs with high AAs market share
12The results remain qualitatively similar if we restrict to firms appearing in the baseline sample only.
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experienced lower accrual-based earnings manipulation relative to clients in MSAs with low AAs
market share following the collapse of AA. The result is consistent with lower competition increasing
accrual quality.
Table 8 uses the likelihood of restatement as a measure of audit quality. The dependent variable
is one if a firm restates its financial statement and the financial impact of the restatement is negative,
and zero otherwise. The result shows that clients in MSAs with high AA’s market share experienced
lower level of restatement following the collapse of AA relative to clients in MSAs with low AA’s
market share. The result, however, holds only for clients in low litigation risk industries. In other
words, auditors in high litigation risk industries do not change their audit quality in response
to competition. Because restatements are significant events, no results from high litigation risk
industries are consistent with heightened concerns for lawsuits from auditors’ perspective and are
consistent with our model in section 2.2. A lower restatement rate in low litigation risk industries
are consistent with higher audit quality.
[Insert Table 8.]
5.3 Two Dimensions of Auditor Competition Heterogeneity
In this section, we explore the heterogeneity of audit market competition along two dimensions.
The first dimension relates to the role of external monitoring by institutional investors and stock
analysts. The second dimension relates to audit fees.
5.3.1 External monitoring
Our model in section 2 predicts that auditors’ incentive to lower their professional standards
facing fiercer competition decreases with stronger external monitoring. In the model, stronger
external monitoring increases the reputational cost for the auditors to lower their professional
standards. Moreover, clients are less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior facing stronger
external monitoring, which in turn reduces auditors’ incentive to lower audit quality.
We test this hypothesis by employing institutional ownership and analyst coverage as proxies
for external monitoring. Prior studies document a positive role of institutional investors in corpo-
rate governance, which is associated with better information environment and external monitoring
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(Ajinkya et al., 2005). Similar effects have been found for analyst coverage. Analysts specialize
in information production. A reduction in information asymmetry increases the likelihood that
misreporting can be discovered. Therefore, if intense auditor competition erodes audit quality, we
would conjecture this effect to be weaker for firms with a higher share of institutional ownership
and higher analyst coverage.
We collect institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters 13F database. The SEC re-
quires all institutional organizations, companies, universities, and so on that exercise discretionary
management of investment portfolios over $100 million in asset value to report those holdings on
a quarterly basis. We sort all firms in the baseline sample by their institutional ownership share
as of the end of 2001, prior to AA collapse year, and repeat the baseline regression in Eq.8 in
subsamples of high and low institutional ownership share. Prior study documents institutional
ownership share is correlated with firm size (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). To remove the size effect,
the institutional ownership share is scaled by firm market capitalization so that our result does not
simply reflect a size effect. We report the regression results in Table 9. In Columns (1)-(2) where
no control variables are added, the coefficient estimate of Treat× Post is statistically negative in
the subsample of low institutional ownership share but statistically and economically insignificant
in the subsample of high institutional ownership share. The results are robust to various regression
specifications that control for the firm and loan-level characteristics and a set of industry-by-year
dummies. In Column (7), we pool firms in both subsamples and perform the same triple-difference
regression as in Eq.13 except that we replace DFee with a binary variable DIO that takes value one
if the firm is assigned to the group high institutional ownership and zero otherwise. We find the
coefficient of Treat×Post×DIO is statistically estimate, suggesting the estimates of Treat×Post
in the subsamples of high and low institutional ownership share are significantly different in the
subsample analysis.
[Insert Table 9.]
We obtain analyst earning forecasts data from I/B/E/S database. We sort all clients in the
baseline sample into subsamples according to the number of analysts that report earning forecasts
for a client during the fiscal year 2001. To the extent that stock analysts tend to prefer large
firms, we adjust the analyst count also by market capitalization to avoid the sample partition
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reflecting the difference of client size. We perform the baseline regression in each subsample and
report the regressions results in Table 10. We find the effect of audit market competition on cost
of bank loans only appears in the subsample of low analyst coverage, whereas the effect vanishes
when the analyst coverage is high. The difference in the effect of auditor competition between the
subsamples of high and low analyst coverage persists across various specifications controlling for
firm and bank loan characteristics and a set of industry dummies or industry-by-year dummies. We
also perform a triple-difference test in Column (7), where the indicator variable DAnaly is one if the
firm is assigned to high analyst coverage subsample and zero otherwise. The statistically significant
estimate for Treat× Post×DAnaly implies the difference between the coefficient of Treat× Post
in two subsamples are not statistically indifferent.
[Insert Table 10.]
Overall, our findings highlight the importance of external monitoring, proxied by institutional
ownership and analyst following, in driving the relation between competition and cost of bank loans.
Consistent with our model prediction, higher external monitoring reduces the auditors’ incentive
to engage in opportunistic behavior, which dampens the relation between competition and cost of
bank loans. Classical competition theories do not have this prediction.
5.3.2 Audit Fees
From the discussion in section 2, lower audit fees due to fiercer competition among auditors can
lower audit quality and increase clients’ cost of bank loans. We test the prediction by examining
auditors that receive lower fees conditional on observed client characteristics. To measure the fee
pressure, we estimate an audit fee prediction model and use the residual term from the estimation
to proxy for the audit fee pressure. We follow Gerakos and Syverson (2015) and estimate the
following model using all Compustat firms that have audit fee information from AuditAnalytics
during 2000−2001,
ln(Audit Fees,t) = pi0 + pi1 ln(Assetss,t) + pi2 ln(Industry Segs,t) + pi3Leverages,t
+pi4ROAs,t + pi5Inventorys,t + pi6D
Auditor Change
s,t + pi7D
Foreign + pi8Big4 + κj + ρs,t
(12)
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where ln(Audit Fees,t) denotes the log of audit fees, ln(Industry Segs,t) the log of industry segment
numbers, Inventorys,t the inventory plus receivables divided by total assets, D
Auditor Change
s,t a
dummy variable that takes value one if a firm s changes its auditor in year t, and DForeign a
dummy variable that takes value one if a firm has sales in foreign countries. Big4 is a dummy
variable indicating whether the Big four auditor firm has an office in same MSA as the client’s
headquarters. κj denote three-digit industry dummies. The estimated results are presented in the
Appendix.
We argue that a lower residual from the estimation suggests fiercer price competition among
auditors. We evenly sort firms into subsamples according to their audit fee pressure in 2001 and
predict that the change in cost of debt concentrates on auditors with higher fee pressure, that is,
lower residuals from the audit fee regression.
The regression results in Table 11 indicate that the effect of auditor competition on cost of
bank loans in the baseline regression is mainly driven by the group of firms that pay relatively
less auditor fees (high fee pressure). In the subsample of high fee pressure, the coefficient estimate
of Treat × Post is significantly positive. In contrast, the coefficient estimate of Treat × Post is
insignificant in the subsample of low fee pressure. This result is robust across all regression models
regardless whether we add firm level control variables. In Column (7), we pool all firms together
and run a triple-difference regression in the full sample. The regression specification is given as
follows
ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t+1) = φ0 + φ1Treat× Post×DFee + φ2Treat× Post+ φ3Treat×DFee
+φ4Post×DFee + φ5Treat+ φ6Post+ φ7DFee + Ψ′X + κj,t + ηi,s,t+1
(13)
where binary variable DFee is one if the audit fee pressure of a firm is above the median and zero
otherwise.
[Insert Table 11.]
The estimated coefficient for the variable of interest Treat×Post×DFee is significantly negative,
suggesting the effect of competition on cost of bank loans depends on the audit fees. As discussed
in section 2.2, fiercer price competition leaves less room for auditors to further lower price and
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forces them to compete in other ways. In the presence of opinion shopping, our model predicts
that auditors will lower audit quality. Fiercer price competition presumably also increases the
client’s bargaining power to force concession from their auditors. Under both interpretations, lower
audit fees are associated with a higher likelihood of opportunistic behavior and a greater effect of
competition on audit quality.
6 Conclusion
Regulators have long been concerned that a highly concentrated audit market can erode audit
quality. Motivated by these concerns, regulators in some jurisdictions have already taken actions to
break up the concentrated auditing market dominated by the Big Four.13 However, surprisingly, the
perception shared by regulators of low competition impairing audit quality seems to be supported
only by isolated fraudulent events and the empirical evidence as to the causal effects of audit
market competition on audit quality is far from conclusive. Furthermore, given the scrutinizing
role of auditors in the capital market, it’s also important to know whether auditor competition
materially impacts functioning of the capital market. In light of these issues, we study the effect
of auditor competition on audit quality and, by extension, the cost of bank loans.
We first model oligopolistic audit market under the assumption that clients shop for better
audit opinions (i.e., opinion shopping). Our model predicts that, in the presence of audit opinion
shopping, competition in the auditing market can lower audit quality. We empirically test the
model’s prediction using the spatial variation in the market share of Arthur Anderson as shocks
to local market competition. We find that a larger decrease in local market competition due to
Arthur Anderson’s collapse reduces clients’ cost of bank loans more. Our results are robust to a
battery of robustness checks and are not driven by trends in the local economy, industry shocks, or
the passage of SOX. The effects on cost of bank loans are stronger when auditors face higher price
competition and when clients and auditors face weaker external monitoring.
Our results should not be interpreted as promoting the idea that the audit industry should be
further consolidated in order to benefit the clients. Rather, the evidence suggests that higher con-
centration does not necessarily hurt clients. Our findings caution against applying predictions from
13For example, an important goal of the recent European audit reform is to promote audit market competition.
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2244_en.htm.
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classical oligopoly competition models where an increase in competition results in lower price and
higher quality (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Our theory and empirical evidence, combined with
findings from prior studies for opinion shopping, suggest that clients’ incentive to shop for better
opinions plus auditors’ profit maximization objective jointly affect audit quality. The collective
evidence of the paper points to an important role of clients’ opportunistic behavior in regulating
the audit market.
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Appendix: Variable Description
Variables Definition
Loan-level Variables
ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t) The natural logarithm of loan spread that is measured as All-in-Spread drawn
in DealScan database. All-in-Spread is defined as the amount the borrower pays
in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down. This measure adds the
borrowing spread of the loan over LIBOR with any annual fee paid to the bank
group. Source: DealScan Database.
Loan Sizei,s,t It is defined as the amount of loan facility issued in year t divided by total assets
measured at the end of corresponding fiscal year. Source: DealScan and Compus-
tat Databases.
ln(Maturityi,s,t) The natural logarithm of loan maturity measured in months. Source: DealScan
Database.
DSyndication Dummy variable that takes value one if the distribution method of the loan facility
is coded as ’Syndication’. Source: DealScan Database.
Firm-level Variables
ln(Assetss,t) The natural logarithm of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat Database.
ROAs,t Return on assets, measured as operating income (OIBDP) divided by total assets
(AT). Source: Compustat Database.
Tangibilitys,t It is measured as net capital stock (PPENT) relative to total assets (AT).
Source:Compustat Database.
Leverages,t Leverage ratio, defined as current debt (DLC) plus long-term debt (DLTT) and
then divided by total market capitalization measured at corresponding fiscal year
end. Source: Compustat and CRSP Databases.
MBs,t Market to book ratio, measured as the market capitalization divided by total assets
(AT) measured at the end of fiscal year. Source: Compustat and CRSP Databases.
CF V ols,t Cash flow volatility. We first calculate the change in quarterly operating income
(OIBDPQ) relative to total assets(ATQ) and next compute cash flow volatility as
the standard deviation of the value obtained in the first step over the past eight
consecutive quarters. Source: Compustat Database.
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Variables Definition
Firm-level Variables
AuditFees,t Audit fee of firm s in year t, which is calculated as the audit fee divided by total
assets (AT). Source: Compustat and AuditAnalytics Database.
Z-Scores,t We follow Sufi (2009) and calculate the Z-Score as Z-Score=3.3×OIBDPAT + SALEAT +
1.4REAT + 1.2× WCAPAT . Source: Compustat Database.
EMAccruals,t Accrual-based earnings management measured by the performance-matched dis-
cretionary accrual following Kothari et al. (2005). It is calculated as a firms dis-
cretionary accruals minus the corresponding accruals of a matched firm from the
same fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry with the closest return on assets. We
estimate within each fiscal year and two-digit SIC industry the following modified
Jones model
TAs,t
Assets,t−1
= β1
1
Assets,t−1
+ β2
∆Sales,t
Assets,t−1
+ β3
PPEs,t
Assets,t−1
+ s,t, where
TAs,t is total accruals measured by earnings before extraordinary items and dis-
continued operations (IBC), Assets,t−1 is total assets (AT ) of year t−1, ∆Sales,t
is the change in sales (SALE) from year t − 1 to t, and PPEs,t is gross capital
stock (PPEGT ). We obtain normal accrual NA by substituting the estimated co-
efficients βˆ1, βˆ2, and βˆ3 into NAs,t = βˆ1
1
Assets,t−1
+βˆ2
∆Sales,t−ARs,t
Assets,t−1
+βˆ3
PPEs,t
Assets,t−1
,
where ∆ARs,t is the change in account receivable (RECT ). The discretionary ac-
crual is defined as the difference between
TAs,t
Assets,t−1
and NAs,t. Source: Compustat
Database.
Restatements,t A dummy variable that takes value one if the financial report of firm s in year t is
restated in a future time and the financial impact of the restatement is negative,
and zero otherwise. Source: AuditAnalytics Database.
MSA-level Variables
∆HHIm,2001−2002 The change of auditor market concentration in MSA m from 2001 to 2002. It is
defined as the Herfindahl Hirschman index of auditor market share (in terms of
audit fee) for MSA m in 2002 less that in 2001. Source: AuditAnalytics Database.
∆HHIBig5m,2001−2002 The change of auditor market concentration of big five auditors in MSA m from
2001 to 2002. It is defined the same as ∆HHIm,2001−2002 except that only market
share of the big five auditors is considered. Source: AuditAnalytics Database.
AA Sharem,2001 The market share of Arthur Andersen in terms of audit fee in MSA m in year
2001. Source: AuditAnalytics Database.
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t=0 t=2t=1
Lender 
offers loan 
with interest 
rate r1.
True state of the world is 
realized. Lender and auditor 
receive payoff. Client chooses 
auditor.  Lender offers credit 
credits with interest rate r2.
True state of the 
world is realized. 
Lender and 
auditor receive 
payoff. 
Auditor performs 
auditing service and 
issues a report  𝑟 ∈{𝑔, 𝑏}. Lender chooses 
the monitoring decision. 
Auditor performs 
auditing service and 
issues a report  𝑟 ∈{𝑔, 𝑏}. Lender chooses 
the monitoring decision. 
Figure 1: Timeline
This figure depicts the timeline of the model in section 2.1.
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5th Quintile
4th Quintile
3rd Quintile
2nd Quintile
1st Quintile
Figure 2: The figure plots the change of auditor concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl
Hirschman Index (HHI), in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) from 2001 to 2002. We deduct
the HHI of 2001 from that of 2002 and use different colors to represent each quintile of the change,
with dark red for the fifth quintile, light red for the fourth quintile, orange for the third quintile,
yellow for the secon quindtile, and light yellow for the first
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−
.
2
−
.
15
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
Co
st
 o
f B
an
k 
Lo
an
s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fiscal Year
Treat
Control
Panel B: Evolvement of Cost of Bank Loans (PSM Sample)
Figure 3: This figure shows the evolvement of cost of bank loans over sample period 2000–2004
in the full sample (Panel A) and propensity-score matched sample (Panel B) as defined in Table
5, respectively. In each panel, we regress the log of cost of bank loans on the same set of control
variables and industry and MSA dummies (except Treat, Control, and Treat×Control) as in the
Column 6 of Table 3 and plot the average residual across treated/control group over each year.
41
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the regression
analysis during period 2000–2004. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for a set of loan-level variables
that include the natural logarithm of loan spread ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t), loan size Loan Sizei,s,t, the natu-
ral logarithm of loan maturity measured in months ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy variable indicating the
loan distribution method DSyndicationi,t . Panel B reports firm-level characteristics that include the natural
logarithm of total assets ln(Assetss,t), as a measure for firm size; return on assets ROAs,t; the amount of
tangible assets Tangibilitys,t, as measured by net capital stock (PPENT) divided by total assets; market
to book ratio MBs,t; leverage ratio Leverages,t, as defined by total debts divided by market capitaliza-
tion; cash flow volatility CF V ols,t, as measured by the standard deviation of quarterly earning change
relative to total assets; and Altman z score, Z-Scores,t. Other firm-level variables include an earnings man-
agement measure proxied by performance-matched abnormal accrual, EMAccruals,t , and a dummy variable
Restatements,t, indicating whether a financial statement issued by firm s in year t has been restated and
the financial impact of the restatement is negative. Panel C reports the descriptive statistics of three MSA
level variables. The first variable ∆HHIm,2001−2002 considers all auditors in a MSA and is calculated as
the HHI of auditors’ market share (in terms of audit fees) of MSA m in 2002 less that in 2001. The second
variable ∆HHIBig 5m,2001−2002 is defined similarly but only considers big five auditors. AA’s market share in
2001 is denoted by AA Sharem,2001. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
N Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75
Panel A: Loan level
ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t) 7,067 4.945 0.872 4.382 5.165 5.617
Loan sizei,s,t 7,067 0.169 0.246 0.044 0.107 0.217
ln(Maturityi,s,t) 7,067 3.507 0.733 2.890 3.584 4.094
DSyndicate 7,067 0.944 0.230 1.000 1.000 1.000
Panel B: Firm level
ln(Assetss,t) 3,427 6.812 1.900 5.509 6.747 8.045
ROAs,t 3,427 0.117 0.139 0.082 0.122 0.170
Tangibilitys,t 3,427 0.310 0.229 0.128 0.251 0.454
Leverages,t 3,427 0.888 2.651 0.092 0.291 0.761
MBs,t 3,427 2.625 2.210 1.219 1.970 3.268
CF V ol.s,t 3,427 0.018 0.025 0.006 0.011 0.022
AuditFees,t 3,427 1.359 2.089 0.332 0.711 1.592
Z-Scores,t 3,427 1.762 1.984 1.064 1.922 2.681
EMAccruals,t 13,388 -0.000 0.215 -0.076 -0.001 0.077
Restatements,t 15,923 0.123 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: MSA level
∆HHIm,2001−2002 58 0.037 0.085 0.006 0.036 0.070
∆HHIBig 5m,2001−2002 58 0.037 0.086 0.005 0.035 0.070
AA Sharem,2001 58 0.163 0.131 0.081 0.144 0.219
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Table 2: Validity Test: The Effects of Arthur Andersen Collapse on Competition
This table reports OLS regression of the change of auditor competition from 2001 to 2002 on AA’s market
share in 2001. The first dependent variable ∆HHIm,2001−2002 considers all auditors in a MSA and is
calculated as the HHI of auditors’ market share (in terms of audit fees) of MSA m in 2002 less that in
2001. The second dependent variable ∆HHIBig 5m,2001−2002 is defined similarly but only considers big five
auditors. AA’s market share in 2001 is denoted by AA Sharem,2001. D
AA Share
m,2001 is a binary variable that is
one if AA Sharem,2001 is above the median and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level
are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
∆HHIm,2001−2002 ∆HHI
Big 5
m,2001−2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Sharem,2001 0.210*** 0.728*** 0.211*** 0.731***
[2.73] [3.90] [2.74] [3.90]
AA Share2m,2001 -1.132*** -1.134***
[-3.03] [-3.02]
DAA Sharem,2001 0.059*** 0.059***
[2.79] [2.79]
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
R2 0.103 0.196 0.122 0.104 0.197 0.122
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Table 3: Auditor Competition and Cost of Bank Loans: A Difference-in-Difference Test
This table reports the regression of cost of bank loans on auditor competition using the difference-in-difference
specification during period 2000–2004. The dependent variable is the log of loan spread ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t)
for loan facility i borrowed by firm s in year t. The indicator variable Treat is one if AA’s local market
share in 2001 is above the median, and zero otherwise. Indicator variable Post is one for the period on
and after 2002 and zero otherwise. Control variables for firm characteristics include firm size ln(Assetss,t),
return on assets ROAs,t, the amount of tangible assets Tangibilitys,t, leverage ratio Leverages,t, market to
book ratio MBs,t, cash flow volatility CF V ols,t, audit fees AuditFees,t, and Altman z score Z-Scores,t.
Loan-level control variables consist of the amount of loan facility Loan Sizei,s,t, the maturity of loan facility
ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy variable indicating the loan distribution method D
Syndication. A set of MSA
dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies are controlled in various specifications. Robust t-statistics
clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
Dep. Var. ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat× Post -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.118*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.086**
[-2.82] [-3.36] [-2.92] [-3.02] [-2.76] [-2.16]
Treat 0.220**
[2.22]
Post 0.053 0.004 0.013 0.024 0.017 -0.045
[1.27] [0.10] [0.36] [0.64] [0.43] [-1.08]
ln(Assetss,t−1) -0.244*** -0.252*** -0.254*** -0.261***
[-20.67] [-20.73] [-20.94] [-23.43]
ROAs,t−1 -0.771*** -0.809*** -0.408*** -0.404***
[-4.78] [-5.22] [-3.26] [-3.11]
Tangibilitys,t−1 -0.115 -0.122 -0.183** -0.198**
[-1.38] [-1.45] [-2.08] [-2.43]
Lervages,t−1 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.043***
[4.71] [4.76] [4.48] [4.85]
MBs,t−1 -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.056*** -0.053***
[-6.11] [-5.93] [-6.21] [-6.24]
CF V ols,t−1 -0.588 -0.458 -0.598 -0.329
[-1.12] [-0.86] [-1.00] [-0.59]
AuditFees,t−1 -0.016** -0.024*** -0.020***
[-2.61] [-3.13] [-2.71]
Z-Scores,t−1 -0.051*** -0.055***
[-2.85] [-3.41]
Loan Sizei,s,t−1 -0.199***
[-4.33]
ln(Maturityi,s,t−1) 0.158***
[8.43]
DSyndication 0.118**
[2.55]
MSA FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE NO YES YES YES YES YES
N 7,065 7,065 5,468 5,468 5,468 5,468
R2 0.006 0.284 0.543 0.544 0.549 0.565
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Table 4: Placebo Tests
This table reports the regression results for the placebo tests. We repeat the regression specification in
Column 6 of Table 3 except that the event year is replaced with a pseudo event year as indicated by the
subscript of Post. A full set of firm-level and loan-level control variables are included in all regression
specifications but are suppressed for brevity. We also include MSA dummies and three-digit SIC industry
dummies. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dep. Var.
ln(Loan Spreadi,s,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat× Post2007 -0.059
[-1.18]
Treat× Post2008 -0.080
[-1.23]
Treat× Post2009 -0.020
[-0.31]
Treat× Post2010 0.020
[0.46]
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Loan Controls YES YES YES YES
MSA FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
N 4,206 4,058 3,384 2,741
R2 0.498 0.466 0.371 0.434
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results in the Propensity-Score-Matched Sample
This table reports the regression of cost of bank loans on auditor competition using the difference-in-
differences specification in a propensity-score matched sample. The sample consists of 544 treated firms
that are matched to control firms in the pre-SOX period. Control firms are a subset of the non-treated firms
selected as the closest match to the treated firms, based on the same two-digit SIC industry and propensity
scores generated based on a set of pre-SOX firm characteristics including firm size, tangibility, profitabil-
ity, discretionary accounting accrual, and restatement incidence. Panel A reports the summary statistics
and compares the mean of matching variables for the treated and control groups in the matched sample
in the pre-collapse period. Panel B reports the regression results. A set of MSA dummies and three-digit
SIC industry dummies are controlled in various specifications. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level
are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
Panel A: Comparison of Treated and Matched Control Firms
Treated Firms Matched Control Firms Difference
Mean STD Median Mean STD Median (1)-(4) t-stat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(Assetss,t) 6.497 2.001 6.399 6.659 1.843 6.642 -0.162 -1.483
ROAs,t 0.111 0.176 0.124 0.115 0.148 0.125 -0.004 -0.469
Tangibilitys,t 0.312 0.242 0.248 0.311 0.227 0.262 0.001 0.080
EMAccruals,t -0.010 0.187 -0.006 0.005 0.190 0.001 -0.014 -1.332
Restatements,t 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.188 0.391 0.000 -0.029 -1.347
Panel B: DID Results using the Propensity Score Matched Sample
Dep. Var. ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat× Post -0.343*** -0.252*** -0.164*** -0.154***
[-4.45] [-4.19] [-2.75] [-2.67]
Treat 0.129
[1.53]
Post 0.009 -0.030 0.069 0.025
[0.15] [-0.62] [1.18] [0.45]
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES
Loan Controls NO NO NO YES
MSA FE NO YES YES YES
Industry FE NO YES YES YES
N 4,096 4,096 3,657 3,657
R2 0.018 0.407 0.633 0.647
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
This table reports the robustness checks for our baseline specification. Columns (1)–(2) examine the choice
for the selection of treated and control groups. In Column (1), we divide MSAs into quintiles by AA’s
market share in 2001 and denote the ith quintile by a dummy variable AA ShareQi. Column (2) uses
AA’s market share of 2001, AA Sharem,2001, to measure the treatment effect. In Column (3), the dummy
variable Y ear200i is one for year 200i and zero otherwise. Column (4) repeats the baseline regression by
including industry-by-year fixed effects. All specifications control the same set of firm-level and loan-level
control variables (except Treat, Post, and Treat×Post) as in the Column (6) of Table 3. Robust t-statistics
clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
Dep. Var. ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA ShareQ2 × Post -0.127
[-1.43]
AA ShareQ3 × Post -0.168*
[-1.78]
AA ShareQ4 × Post -0.200**
[-2.35]
AA ShareQ5 × Post -0.221**
[-2.64]
AA Sharem,2001 × Post -0.329*
[-1.89]
Treat× Y ear2002 -0.060
[-1.02]
Treat× Y ear2003 -0.076*
[-1.67]
Treat× Y ear2004 -0.112***
[-2.66]
Y ear2002 0.030
[0.58]
Y ear2003 -0.057
[-1.34]
Y ear2004 -0.153***
[-3.69]
Treat× Post -0.097*
[-1.94]
Post 0.072 -0.035 -0.024
[0.90] [-0.78] [-0.23]
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES
Loan Controls YES YES YES YES
MSA FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES NO
Industry × Year FE NO NO NO YES
N 5,468 5,468 5,468 5,468
R2 0.565 0.564 0.570 0.530
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Table 7: Auditor Competition and Earnings Management
This table reports regression of earnings management on auditor competition using the difference-in-
difference specification. The dependent variable EMAccruals,t is measured by the performance-matched discre-
tionary accrual following Kothari et al. (2005). The indicator variable Treat marks MSAs with above-median
AA market share. Indicator variable Post is one for the period on and after 2002 and zero otherwise. We
use audit fee (AuditFees,t) to control for audit quality input. Firm-level control variables include firm size
(ln(Assetss,t)), market to book ratio (MBs,t), leverage ratio (Leverages,t), and return on assets (ROAs,t).
A set of MSA dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies are controlled in various specifications. Robust
t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
EMAccruals,t
(1) (2) (3)
Treat× Post -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021***
[-3.06] [-3.02] [-3.06]
Treat 0.021*** 0.017***
[3.53] [3.22]
Post 0.006* 0.007** 0.007**
[1.68] [2.09] [2.07]
AuditFees,t 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.67] [-0.69] [-0.66]
ln(Assetss,t) -0.014*** -0.014***
[-7.96] [-7.87]
MBs,t -0.000 -0.000
[-0.36] [-0.48]
Leverages,t -0.001** -0.001***
[-2.64] [-2.71]
ROAs,t 0.028*** 0.027***
[3.41] [3.24]
MSA FE NO NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
N 13,388 13,314 13,314
R2 0.027 0.041 0.045
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Table 8: Auditor Competition and Accounting Restatement
This table reports a difference-in-difference regression of accounting restatement on auditor competition us-
ing the linear probability model in the industries of low and high litigation risk, as defined by Reichelt and
Wang (2010), respectively. The dependent variable is one if a firm-year has restatement that negatively in-
fluences financial outcome and zero otherwise. The indicator variable Treat marks MSAs with above-median
AA market share in 2001. Dummy variable Post is one for the period on and after 2002 and zero otherwise.
Audit-related control variables include audit fees ln(Audit Feess,t) and accounting-based earning manage-
ment measure EMAccruals,t . We also control a set of firm-level characteristic variables including firm size
(ln(Assetss,t)), market to book ratio (MBs,t), leverage ratio (Leverages,t), and return on assets (ROAs,t).
A set of MSA dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies are controlled in various specifications. Robust
t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
Low Litigation Risk High Litigation Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat× Post -0.028** -0.028** -0.028** 0.055 0.053 0.061
[-2.30] [-2.26] [-2.25] [1.49] [1.41] [1.65]
Treat 0.009 0.013 -0.052** -0.045*
[0.91] [1.31] [-2.07] [-1.95]
Post 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.063***
[8.89] [8.06] [7.86] [3.65] [3.13] [3.21]
AuditFees,t 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.004** 0.001 0.001
[0.37] [1.51] [1.38] [-2.10] [0.57] [0.30]
EMAccruals,t -0.060*** -0.049** -0.047** -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.040**
[-2.89] [-2.49] [-2.39] [-4.12] [-2.85] [-2.11]
ln(Assetss,t) 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.025***
[3.71] [3.23] [4.91] [5.22]
MBs,t -0.007*** -0.006*** 0.005 0.005
[-3.32] [-3.00] [1.01] [0.94]
Leverages,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001
[-0.45] [-0.49] [-1.34] [-0.15]
ROAs,t -0.004 -0.001 0.022 0.017
[-0.24] [-0.05] [0.80] [0.56]
MSA FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 9,567 9,523 9,523 3,322 3,300 3,300
R2 0.088 0.092 0.107 0.107 0.120 0.163
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Table 9: Institutional Ownership
This table examines the effect of auditor competition on cost of bank loans as a function of institutional
ownership, which is scaled by the market capitalization to control for the effect stemming from firm sizes.
We evenly sort firms into subsamples by the average institutional ownership in 2000 and 2001, where we
label as ‘Low’ if the institutional ownership is lower than the median value and as ‘High’ otherwise. Column
(7) reports the results of a triple-difference regression in the full sample. The dummy variable Treat marks
MSAs with above-median AA market share in 2001. The dummy variable Post is one for the period on and
after 2002 and zero otherwise. The dummy variable DHighInst takes value one if a firm’s average institutional
ownership in 2000 and 2001 is above the median and zero otherwise. Firm-level control variables include
firm size (ln(Assetss,t)), return on assets (ROAs,t), the amount of tangible assets (Tangibilitys,t), leverage
ratio (Leverages,t), market to book ratio (MBs,t), cash flow volatility (CF V ols,t), audit fees (AuditFees,t),
and Altman Z score (Z-Scores,t). Loan-level control variables consist of the amount of loan facility Loan
Loan Sizei,s,t, the maturity of loan facility ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy variable indicating if the loan
is syndicated DSyndication. All control variables are suppressed for brevity. A set of MSA dummies and
three-digit SIC industry dummies are controlled. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in
brackets. *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The
detailed variable description is provided in the appendix.
Dep. Var.
ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
Low High Low High Low High Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Post -0.175*** 0.021 -0.180** 0.041 -0.147** 0.054 -0.176**
[-2.69] [0.43] [-2.59] [0.85] [-2.23] [1.14] [-2.41]
Treat× Post×DHighInst 0.202*
[1.94]
Treat×DHighInst -0.122
[-1.30]
Post×DHighInst -0.060
[-0.88]
Post 0.060 -0.176*** 0.050 -0.139*** -0.025 -0.141*** -0.025
[1.11] [-5.16] [0.99] [-4.24] [-0.48] [-4.39] [-0.45]
DHighInst 0.289***
[4.82]
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Loan Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,963 2,768 2,946 2,347 2,946 2,347 5,293
R2 0.335 0.339 0.563 0.423 0.579 0.435 0.577
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Table 10: Analyst Coverage
This table examines the effect of auditor competition on cost of bank loans as a function of analyst coverage,
which is scaled by the market capitalization to control for the effect stemming from firm sizes. We evenly sort
firms into subsamples by the average analyst coverage in 2000 and 2001, where we label as ‘Low’ if the analyst
coverage is lower than the median value and as ‘High’ otherwise. Column (7) reports the results of a triple-
difference regression in the full sample. The dummy variable Treat marks MSAs with above-median AA
market share in 2001. The dummy variable Post is one for the period on and after 2002 and zero otherwise.
The dummy variable DHighAnaly takes value one if a firm’s average analyst coverage in 2000 and 2001 is
above the median and zero otherwise. Firm-level control variables include firm size (ln(Assetss,t)), return
on assets (ROAs,t), the amount of tangible assets (Tangibilitys,t), leverage ratio (Leverages,t), market to
book ratio (MBs,t), cash flow volatility (CF V ols,t), audit fees (AuditFees,t), and Altman Z score (Z-
Scores,t). Loan-level control variables consist of the amount of loan facility Loan Sizei,s,t, the maturity of
loan facility ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy variable indicating if the loan is syndicated D
Syndication. All
control variables are suppressed for brevity. A set of MSA dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies
are controlled. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is
provided in the appendix.
Dep. Var.
ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
Low High Low High Low High Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Post -0.286*** 0.020 -0.242*** 0.049 -0.206*** 0.056 -0.273***
[-4.54] [0.42] [-3.37] [0.90] [-3.01] [1.01] [-4.11]
Treat× Post×DHighAnaly 0.326***
[3.52]
Treat×DHighAnaly -0.267**
[-2.59]
Post×DHighAnaly -0.074
[-0.90]
Post 0.088 -0.139*** 0.038 -0.099** -0.039 -0.100** -0.004
[1.52] [-3.63] [0.59] [-2.27] [-0.64] [-2.21] [-0.06]
DHighAnaly 0.365***
[4.23]
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Loan Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,691 2,527 2,611 2,216 2,611 2,216 4,827
R2 0.385 0.278 0.628 0.382 0.643 0.391 0.600
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Table 11: Abnormal Audit Fees
This table examines the effect of auditor competition on cost of bank loans as a function of abnormal
audit fees, which is proxied by the residual from an audit fee prediction model estimated during 2000–
2001. We evenly sort firms into subsamples by the median value of abnormal audit fees in 2001, where
we label as ‘Low’ if the abnormal fee is lower than the median value and as ‘High’ otherwise. Column
(7) reports the results of a triple-difference regression in the full sample. Dummy variable Treat marks
MSAs with above-median AA market share in 2001. Dummy variable Post is one for the period on and
after 2002 and zero otherwise. Dummy variable DHighFee is one for a firm with above-median abnormal
fee in 2001 and zero otherwise. Firm-level control variables include firm size (ln(Assetss,t)), return on
assets (ROAs,t), the amount of tangible assets (Tangibilitys,t), leverage ratio (Leverages,t), market to book
ratio (MBs,t), cash flow volatility (CF V ols,t), audit fees (AuditFees,t), and Altman Z score (Z-Scores,t).
Loan-level control variables consist of the amount of loan facility Loan Loan Sizei,s,t, the maturity of loan
facility ln(Maturityi,s,t), and a dummy variable indicating if the loan is syndicated D
Syndication. All control
variables are suppressed for brevity. A set of MSA dummies and three-digit SIC industry dummies are
controlled. Robust t-statistics clustered at MSA level are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote
the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The detailed variable description is
provided in the appendix.
Dep. Var.
ln(LoanSpreadi,s,t)
Low High Low High Low High Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treat× Post -0.299*** 0.050 -0.164*** 0.011 -0.137** 0.026 -0.169***
[-4.27] [0.58] [-2.77] [0.16] [-2.39] [0.39] [-2.71]
Treat× Post×DHighFee 0.174*
[1.81]
Treat×DHighFee 0.024
[0.25]
Post×DHighFee -0.117*
[-1.70]
Post 0.037 -0.094 0.034 -0.060 -0.029 -0.097* -0.010
[0.79] [-1.44] [0.68] [-1.03] [-0.58] [-1.75] [-0.18]
DHighFee -0.021
[-0.33]
Firm Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Loan Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
MSA FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 3,147 2,485 2,706 2,145 2,706 2,145 4,851
R2 0.409 0.401 0.641 0.581 0.657 0.591 0.573
52
